A real example of the book, unfortunately. I say this with all the respect in the world. We are tal

A few days were fulfilled 19 years after the Challenger tragedy. A very sad event, which cost the lives of seven astronauts, and that was due to a serious error in the assessment of risk and putting the other criteria of prudence technique.
Agrees that February jacket 1 will mark 12 years of the second program of historical catastrophe American space shuttles. The Columbia, in 2003, revealed that, again, the weakness in the process of scaling within NASA. But above all portrayed as the weight of a bureaucratic organization can stifle flexibility and responsiveness face a crisis, as the commission of inquiry concluded that the US government held an emergency later the accident.
A real example of the book, unfortunately. I say this with all the respect in the world. We are talking about NASA, where the organization is leading, and in many ways admirable. Precisely for this reason we should give pause to all, especially those who have responsibility for management of companies and organizations.
The Columbia was ready to take off from Kennedy Space Center, Florida, on January jacket 16. On board, 7 astronauts, which was the flight number 28 of this iconic ship. Apparently, the launch was carried out satisfactorily. But the next day, a thorough analysis of the images recorded by the cameras at the launch pad was like a piece of insulation material that covered an engine fuel flowed and struck against the body of the Columbia.
The images do not have enough resolution to make such involvement this time could have had on the structure that functions as a heat shield of Columbia. While the space mission was developed normally ground began a long and tortuous process of discussion on the criticality of the fact.
As always tends to happen in these cases, similarly to the case of the Challenger, engineers were those they adopt a more serious and conservative. According to them, the few details they had, could not be ruled out that the damage had been important and had seriously damaged the protection that should ensure the safe and sound return of Columbia jacket and its crew. During re-entry into the atmosphere, the ship should withstand temperatures of around 1,700 degrees, and the structure of coating used, of course, to protect it from the effects of this warming. jacket A crack in the structure could be catastrophic. jacket
The opinion of the "management", however, was different. Other times there had been detachment fragments during takeoff, which had hit the shield of the shuttle, without causing any damage. On the one hand, the fragments that were off by a kind of foam, a little top heavy material. On the other hand, it relied on the high resistance of the external structure of Columbia, in order to withstand the impact of the foam. Many times before had been reached in this situation and assume correct jacket a defect, but not critical.
But above that, and attention, because this is no more controversial power from an ethical point of view (and, as demonstrated in the research, wrong also from the technical point of view), thought that, never gave the case of serious damage to the structure of protection was better not to notify the crew, the front inability to do anything, usually follow jacket the mission and trust in return Earth ship would be able to survive. As one of the statements were collected, said that face such eventuality, the astronauts also like this way, rather than suffer needlessly knowing that death awaited them after a few days.
Well, the fact is that there was a computer simulation, to try to know the extent to which the structure may have been damaged. To everyone's jacket surprise, including engineers, the simulation results were dramatic. The estimated size of the fragment after the speed of the ship at the time of takeoff, and the angle of incidence jacket estimated impact, the computer predicted a broken plates that formed carbon coat protector. Given this evidence, from some technical jacket levels is recommended to ask the US Air Force tried to take high-definition photographs of the ship in orbit, to assess the damage, if there were (technology to do so existed, and could have tried to photograph Columbia jacket distance from aircraft flying at high altitude).
This request jacket did not progress. Some classes jacket of NASA said that the simulation program was too conservative, and had a tendency to exaggerate the results. Also still thought that, if

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